Directory Confinement and Symlink Escape Prevention

File operations are rooted in the folders the user explicitly authorizes. The Go file layer uses os.Root to keep path resolution confined to an opened workspace root. Before access, filepath.EvalSymlinks resolves the physical target so policy checks evaluate where a path actually leads, rather than trusting its displayed name.

Traversal such as ../ cannot walk above the root. A symlink located inside an allowed workspace that resolves into a non-whitelisted folder is rejected with ACCESS_DENIED. The checks are applied to the resolved path and the confined filesystem operation, closing the common gap where a lexical prefix check alone accepts an outside target.

Hardcoded Sensitive Credential Shield

Workspace approval does not grant access to known credential stores. The guard applies sensitive-path rules even when those paths sit beneath an otherwise allowed workspace root.

  • Credential directories: .ssh, .aws, .gnupg, and .kube.
  • Environment files matching .env*; private-key files such as .pem, .key, id_ed25519, and id_rsa.
  • Shell histories including .zsh_history and .bash_history.
  • Operating-system credential stores, including macOS Keychain and Windows Credential Manager.

These patterns are policy exclusions, not folders that can be re-enabled by adding a broader workspace path.

Tiered Terminal and Command Controls

File Tools, Managed Process Tools such as start_process, and the High-Risk Shell tool execute_command have independent controls. High-Risk Shell is disabled by default. A user can keep file access available while leaving process creation or shell execution off.

When shell access is enabled, a regex-based destructive-command interceptor checks commands against rules for operations such as rm -rf /, mkfs, dd, format, diskpart, shutdown, and shadow-copy deletion. It also checks shell command-substitution and nested-shell forms that can hide destructive commands from a simple first-token match. Matching commands are blocked before launch and recorded for local audit.

Runs with the signed-in user's privileges

AI To Local does not elevate the daemon. The operating system's existing user permissions continue to apply to every process it starts.

Local Dashboard Hardening and CSP

The local dashboard uses two independent 24-byte random values. cspNonce is dedicated to authorizing the page's specific script and style blocks in the Content Security Policy. X-WebBridge-Token authenticates API requests. Neither value substitutes for the other.

The policy removes 'unsafe-inline'. Browser requests must present a loopback-matching Origin or Referer; requests marked Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site are rejected. Non-browser clients must authenticate with the WebBridge token. The dashboard listens on the local loopback interface at 127.0.0.1:18926.

Cryptographic Update Pipeline

Update manifests are canonicalized and verified offline with Go's standard-library crypto/ed25519 verifier and the public key embedded in the core. An invalid or unsigned manifest is rejected before its instructions are trusted.

Downloads are hashed as they stream. The SHA-256 digest must match the signed manifest; on mismatch, the temporary artifact is immediately purged. Manifests accept relative paths only, reject traversal and absolute URLs, and resolve downloads only through the aitolocal.com update domain or the GitHub backup source. Gzip expansion is bounded with io.LimitReader to 250 MB; exceeding the ceiling fails extraction and removes partial output.

Explicit Security Boundary

Application-level guardrails, not an operating-system isolation boundary

AI To Local is an application-level policy and guard engine. It is not a kernel virtual machine or OS container, and its checks do not replace operating-system access controls. Select the smallest practical set of folders, keep shell access disabled unless needed, run without elevated privileges, and maintain regular backups.

Hardware Identity and Atomic Local Audit Log

Device enrollment binds a device identity to an Ed25519 keypair. The private key remains on the device; the corresponding identity supports hardware-bound enrollment and local operation records. Audit entries are appended to a local audit.log using atomic write handling so a partial record is not mistaken for a completed operation.

2026-11-17T10:42:18.114Z ALLOWED  tool=read_file path="/workspace/README.md" duration=1.2ms
2026-11-17T10:42:19.006Z BLOCKED (Rule: Sensitive Path Match) tool=read_file path="/workspace/.ssh/id_ed25519" duration=0.4ms

To report a security issue, contact support@aitolocal.com with [Security] in the subject. Please include a concise reproduction and the affected build; do not include live credentials or private keys.